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WHICH ULP IS IT?: AN EXAMINATION OF 
RETALIATION UNDER SECTIONS 10(A)(1) AND 
10(A)(2) OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC LABOR RELATIONS 
ACT 
By Helen J. Kim 
Helen J. Kim is General Counsel for the Illinois Labor Relations Board. She earned a J.D. from the University of 
Minnesota Law School and a B.S. in Mathematics from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The views 
expressed in this article are the author’s own and not of the State of Illinois or the Illinois Labor Relations Board. 
Nothing in this article should be construed as an advisory opinion or official statement from the Illinois Labor 
Relations Board or its agents. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Illinois Public Relations Act (IPLRA or Act)1 protects public sector employees 
from retaliation by their employers for engaging in certain types of activity.2 
Section 10(a) of the IPLRA, in relevant part, states: 
 
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer or its agents: 
 
(1) to interfere with, restrain or coerce public employees in the 
exercise of the rights guaranteed in this Act or to dominate or 
interfere with the formation, existence or administration of 
any labor organization or contribute financial or other support 
to it; provided, an employer shall not be prohibited from 
permitting employees to confer with him during working 
hours without loss of time or pay; 
 
(2) to discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or 
any term or condition of employment in order to encourage or 
discourage membership in or other support for any labor 
organization. Nothing in this Act or any other law precludes a 
public employer from making an agreement with a labor 
organization to require as a condition of employment the 
payment of a fair share under paragraph (e) of Section 6; . . . 
 
When a public sector employee suffers an adverse employment action after 
exercising rights guaranteed by the Act, is it a violation of Section 10(a)(1), 
Section 10(a)(2), or both? A reading of Sections 10(a)(1) and 10(a)(2) suggests 
that the two sections apply to different and distinct circumstances. The 
distinction between the two sections is significant, for Section 10(a)(2) requires a 
4 LLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT Fall 2019 
 
 
determination of an employer’s specific intent for the complained-of conduct, 
whereas such determination is not required under the broader language of 
Section 10(a)(1). Without recognizing this distinction, the proper analysis cannot 
be applied to determine whether the employer committed an unfair labor 
practice. 
 
Section 10(a)(1) generally applies in cases where the employer’s conduct 
“interfere[s] with, restrain[s], or coerces” public employees in their exercise of 
rights guaranteed by the Act.3 Proof of a public employer’s motive for its conduct 
in such cases is generally not required.4 For example, where an employer 
threatens retaliation for engaging in concerted activity, the Illinois Labor 
Relations Board5 (Board) has evaluated the alleged violative conduct objectively 
without consideration of the employer’s motive due to the nature of the conduct, 
i.e., the threat.6 On the other hand, because Section 10(a)(2) expressly prohibits 
discriminatory adverse employment actions taken for a specified motive—“to 
encourage or discourage membership in or other support for any labor 
organization,” i.e., antiunion animus, evaluation of an employer’s motive for the 
alleged conduct is needed to demonstrate a violation.7  
 
But for Section 10(a)(1) cases involving allegations that an employee suffered an 
adverse employment action because the employee engaged in concerted activity, 
the Board has evaluated the employer’s motive for the employment action 
because unlike a threat where motive is readily apparent, the employer’s reasons 
for discipline or the denial of a promotion may not be as obvious.8 To determine 
motive, the Board has applied the burden-shifting analytical framework for 
Section 10(a)(2) cases set forth in City of Burbank v. ISLRB,9 but without 
consideration of the specific “anti-union animus” motivation.10 This article 
examines the development of the analyses the Board and courts have applied to 
retaliation cases in determining whether public employers have engaged in unfair 
labor practices under Sections 10(a)(1) or 10(a)(2) of the Act.11 
 
II. RETALIATION: THE EARLY YEARS  
 
Shortly after passage of the Act, the State and Local Boards considered under 
Section 10(a)(1) and Section 10(a)(2), several cases involving public employers’ 
actions in response to employee organizing activity. These early State and Local 
Board decisions illustrate the development of the analysis currently used in 
retaliation cases under Sections 10(a)(1) and 10(a)(2) of the Act.  
 
One of the earliest State Board cases, Village of Glendale Heights,12 involved the 
Village’s actions toward James Gagnier, an employee who had actively 
participated in efforts to organize the Village’s public services employees and 
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eventually became steward for the union selected to represent the employees.13 
Shortly after Gagnier became steward, the Village began enforcing its personnel 
and safety rules strictly. It charged Gagnier with several rule violations which led 
it to discipline him and to his eventual discharge.14  
 
The hearing officer noted that where an employee exercises rights under the Act 
but also violates the employer’s rules, allegations that the employer’s actions are 
retaliatory involve both legitimate and illicit employer motives.15 Recognizing the 
challenge posed by such “mixed motive” cases, the hearing officer examined the 
approaches taken by the Wisconsin Supreme Court and at one time taken by by 
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The hearing officer recommended 
that the State Board adopt a similar approach under which conduct would be 
deemed unlawful if an employer is motivated at least in part by an employee’s 
protected activity.16 Following this approach, the hearing officer concluded the 
Village was partly motivated by Gagnier’s participation in the union’s organizing 
efforts and therefore violated Section 10(a)(2), and derivatively Section 10(a)(1) 
of the Act.17 The hearing officer rejected the NLRB’s approach in Wright Line, 
Inc.,18 which allows an employer an affirmative defense if it demonstrates it 
would have taken the adverse action regardless of the employee’s protected 
activity; instead, the hearing officer evaluated the Village’s alleged business 
reasons—violation of its rules—to determine the appropriate remedy for the 
violation.19 The hearing officer found the Village failed to demonstrate it would 
have disciplined and discharged Gagnier regardless of his support for 
unionization and concluded reinstatement with back pay appropriately remedied 
the Village’s unlawful conduct.20 
 
The State Board agreed with the hearing officer’s conclusion that the Village’s 
actions against Gagnier violated Section 10(a)(2) of the Act but declined to adopt 
the recommended “mixed motive” approach because it observed that the record 
demonstrated the Village had no motive for its actions other than Gagnier’s union 
activities.21 The State Board explained although it declined to follow the hearing 
officer’s approach in this particular case, it understood that under the 
recommended approach, the Wright Line analysis would be used to determine 
the appropriate remedy rather than whether the conduct in question constituted 
a violation.22  
 
A few weeks later, the State Board again had occasion to consider applying the 
“mixed motive” approach recommended by the hearing officer in Village of 
Glendale Heights in a case involving another public employer’s alleged retaliatory 
conduct. In State of Illinois Department of Central Management Services. 
(Morgan) (CMS/Morgan),23 Gerald Morgan, a correctional officer working at the 
State of Illinois’s Lincoln Correctional Center, was contacted by an internal 
investigator so that he could be interviewed in connection with an investigation 
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into an inmate escape.24 Morgan refused to answer the investigator’s questions 
without the presence of a union representative and was later discharged for 
refusing to cooperate in the investigation.25 The State Board recognized Morgan’s 
request for union representation during the investigatory interview, i.e., rights 
under the Weingarten doctrine,26 as a right inherent in Section 6 of the Act and 
further determined the State discharged Morgan because he exercised those 
rights.27 Agreeing with the hearing officer’s conclusion that the State’s conduct 
violated Section 10(a)(1), the State Board noted: “If [an employer] disciplines 
[an] employee for refusing to continue in the absence of representation the 
employer is, in effect, retaliating against the employee because he has engaged in 
protected concerted activity, and such conduct is clearly violative of Section 
10(a)(1).”28 
 
Notably, the State Board, recognizing the State’s right to demand accurate 
reporting in the tightly controlled and secured environment of a correctional 
center, re-considered the “mixed motive” approach it declined to take under the 
circumstances in Village of Glendale Heights.29 To balance an employer’s interest 
in enforcing rules of conduct with an employee’s rights under the Act, the State 
Board established a framework to determine whether an employer has engaged in 
an unfair labor practice in cases where the allegations involve employee 
misconduct, but the employer’s actions were motivated, at least in part, by the 
employee’s participation in protected activity:30  
 
When a Charging Party demonstrates that an adverse 
employment action was motivated, at least in part, by 
his having engaged in protected activities, we will find a 
violation of the Act, which will raise a presumption that 
the standard make whole remedy is appropriate. To 
rebut this presumption, the burden will be upon the 
employer to demonstrate that the same action would 
have been taken for legitimate reasons even in the 
absence of the protected activities. If the employer fully 
meets this burden in a discharge situation, it will not be 
required to grant the Charging Party reinstatement and 
back pay. Rather, the only remedy will be the posting of 
a notice.31 
 
Several State Board decisions followed this analysis in cases where both 
legitimate and illicit motives were present.32 In one such case, County of Peoria,33 
the State Board determined a party alleging an employer’s retaliatory conduct 
amounts to a violation of the Act must establish four elements: “(1) union or 
protected concerted activity, (2) employer knowledge of such activity, (3) animus 
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toward such activity, and (4) an adverse employment action under suspect 
circumstances.”34 
 
Meanwhile the Local Board, in Chicago Housing Authority (Gale),35 looked to 
NLRB precedent but took a slightly different approach towards retaliation cases, 
focusing on the language of Section 10(a)(1). Noting the similarity between 
Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)36 and 
Sections 10(a)(1) and 10(a)(2) of the Act, the Local Board observed that the 
comparable sections of the Act should be interpreted in the same fashion as the 
NLRA sections “such that proof of anti-union animus is generally necessary to 
make out a Section 10(a)(2) violation.”37 The inquiry, however, did not end there 
for the Local Board. In the absence of anti-union animus, the Board focused on 
an objective standard, examining whether the employer’s actions had the effect of 
coercing, restraining, or interfering with employees’ rights under the Act rather 
than examining whether the employer was improperly motivated to take the 
complained-of action.38  
 
In Chicago Housing Authority (Gale), Mikel Gale, a fireman with the Chicago 
Housing Authority, alleged he was harassed, disciplined, denied a promotion, 
and finally discharged, because he filed grievances over alleged mistreatment by 
his supervisors.39 The hearing officer, citing American Freightways Co.40 and 
NLRB v. Haberman Construction Co.,41 concluded that retaliation against an 
employee for filing grievances was “inherently destructive” of employee rights 
because it “unambiguously penalizes and deters that protected activity.”42 The 
Local Board upheld the hearing officer’s conclusion that by harassing and 
disciplining Gale for filing grievances, the CHA’s actions effectively restrained 
employees from exercising their rights under the Act in violation of Section 
10(a)(1), but found that the same conduct did not violate Section 10(a)(2).43 
Explaining the “inherently destructive” analysis applies only as a substitute for 
motive in the context of Section 10(a)(2), the Local Board found no evidence of 
antiunion motive where the complained of conduct stemmed from personal 
animosity rather than intent to encourage or discourage membership or other 
support for a labor organization.44  
 
This analysis was applied in City of Chicago, Chicago Police Department 
(Kostro).45 In that case, James Kostro, a police officer, claimed the City 
committed an unfair labor practice when it disciplined him for filing a grievance. 
The City claimed Kostro was disciplined for failing to comply with department 
rules. The hearing officer found that, although the City was partly motivated by 
Kostro’s grievance filing, regardless of the City’s reasons for disciplining Kostro, 
the City’s conduct interfered with Kostro’s exercise of his rights under the Act, in 
this case his filing of a grievance.46 The Local Board adopted the hearing officer’s 
conclusion that the City of Chicago violated Section 10(a)(1) of the Act.47 




III. RETALIATION ANALYSIS UNDER SECTION 10(a)(2) 
ADOPTED IN COURT CASES 
 
As discussed above, the analytical framework set forth in CMS/Morgan was 
followed in subsequent cases involving retaliation until modified by the Illinois 
Appellate Court’s decision in County of Menard v. ISLRB.48 In County of 
Menard, the court reviewed the State Board’s decision in County of Menard 
(II),49 the second of three State Board decisions involving the discharge of a 
County of Menard employee50.  
 
The County of Menard State Board cases concerned an unfair labor practice 
charge filed by the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal 
Employees, Council 31 (AFSCME) alleging the County discharged one of its 
employees, Donald Witherall, in retaliation for his support of AFSCME’s 
organizing campaign. The State Board in County of Menard (I),51 adopted the 
hearing officer’s findings of fact but reversed his conclusion that the discharge 
was proper. The hearing officer had determined the discharge was proper 
because he found no evidence of animus or illegal motivation on the part of the 
County board members who voted to discharge Witherall.52 The State Board 
disagreed and remanded the matter for a determination of whether Witherall’s 
supervisor was illegally motivated by Witherall’s unionizing efforts when he 
recommended Witherall’s discharge to County board members.53  
 
On remand, the hearing officer determined the supervisor was, at least in part, 
illegally motivated in recommending Witherall’s discharge.54 Following the 
framework set forth in CMS/Morgan,55 the hearing officer, after finding the 
discharge violated the Act, determined reinstatement with backpay to be the 
appropriate remedy because the County failed to demonstrate that Witherall 
would have been discharged regardless of his union activities.56 In County of 
Menard (II), the State Board adopted the hearing officer’s recommendations on 
remand concluding that the County unlawfully discharged Witherall, and finding 
reinstatement with backpay to be the appropriate remedy.57  
 
The County petitioned the Illinois Appellate Court to review the State Board’s 
County of Menard (II) decision, urging the court to adopt the NLRB’s Wright 
Line analysis.58 The Fourth District found the County’s arguments persuasive. In 
County of Menard v. ISLRB, 59 the court affirmed the denial of the County’s 
attempt to relitigate certain representation issues but reversed the State Board’s 
determination that the discharge was improper and remanded with instructions 
to apply the Wright Line analysis to the facts in the case.60  
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The court questioned the State Board’s analysis adopted in CMS/Morgan,61 
reasoning that the approach followed a minority view which the court rejected in 
Hardin County Educ. Ass’n. v. IELRB,62 and created an irrebuttable presumption 
wherein an employer could never disprove a violation.63 The court further noted 
that the Wright Line analysis had been applied by the Second District in 
Rockford Township Highway Dep’t. v. ISLRB,64 and by the court in Hardin 
County Education Ass’n. v. IELRB,65 which found the approach in Wright Line 
appropriately balanced competing interests in discriminatory discharges cases 
under Section 14(a)(3) of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act,66 a section 
analogous to Section 10(a)(2) of the Act.67 
 
The court held that the party alleging an unfair labor practice under Section 
10(a)(2) of the Act must establish a prima facie case that the employer was 
motivated to take action against an employee because the employee engaged in 
protected activity.68 Once established, the burden shifts to the employer to show 
by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken action against the 
employee even absent the employee’s participation in protected activity.69 If the 
employer meets this burden, there is no violation of the Act.70 The court 
concluded by remanding the case to the State Board with instructions to apply 
the Wright Line analysis. On remand, Board applied the Wright Line analysis in 
County of Menard (III),71 finding the County violated Sections 10(a)(1) and 
10(a)(2) of the Act and adopting the Wright Line analysis for future cases.72 
 
Shortly after the Fourth District’s decision, the Illinois Supreme Court in City of 
Burbank v. ISLRB,73 solidified the adoption of the Wright Line burden-shifting 
analysis for cases involving retaliation against employees who exercised their 
rights under the Act.74 Unlike the conduct in the County of Menard cases, the 
retaliatory action against the employee in City of Burbank did not involve 
allegations of employee misconduct. Rather, the State Board in City of Burbank 
was confronted with an employee discharge resulting from the City’s 
reorganization of its Public Works department.75 
Two days before the State Board certified AFSCME Council 31 as the exclusive 
representative of employees working in the City of Burbank’s Public Works 
Department, the City of Burbank reorganized the department, eliminating two 
foreman positions and replacing them with one newly created Deputy Director of 
Public Works.76 As a result of this reorganization, Robert Randle, a foreman and 
AFSCME supporter during AFSCME’s organization campaign, was laid off.77 
Norbert Maza, the other foreman who had previously voiced opposition to 
AFSCME’s organization efforts on at least one occasion, was placed into the 
newly created Deputy Director position.78  
The State Board observed that the City of Burbank’s reorganization was 
specifically designed to exclude the foreman positions from collective bargaining 
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in response to its unsuccessful objection to AFSCME’s petition to represent a 
bargaining unit comprising public works employees, including the two foreman 
positions. 79 The State Board noted that the City actively sought to exclude the 
two foreman positions as supervisors, was aware of Randle’s testimony at the 
representation hearing that he wished to be included in the unit, and challenged 
Randle’s ballot after the State Board determined the positions were not 
supervisory and directed an election.80 The State Board also observed that the 
City filed a unit clarification petition to exclude the deputy director position but 
that petition was dismissed.81 Thus, the State Board concluded, the City engaged 
in a pattern of conduct intended to circumvent the Act’s grant of rights to public 
employees and engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Sections 10(a)(1), 
10(a)(2) and 10(a)(3) of the Act.82  
In City of Burbank v. ISLRB,83 the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District 
affirmed the State Board’s decision, rejecting the City of Burbank’s appeal that 
the State Board decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence.84 The 
court identified the central issue in the case was whether Randle’s termination 
was motivated by antiunion animus and concluded that circumstantial evidence 
supported the State Board’s decision finding the City’s reorganization was a 
pretext for antiunion animus.85 The court determined that motive was a question 
of fact and that circumstantial evidence such as the employer’s knowledge of an 
employee’s union activities, the proximity in time between the union activity and 
the adverse employment action, and the employer’s conduct, can be used to 
establish an unfair labor practice.86 
 
The City of Burbank appealed the appellate court’s decision to the Illinois 
Supreme Court. In City of Burbank v. ISLRB,87 the supreme court affirmed the 
appellate court’s decision, setting forth the burden-shifting analysis to be used in 
retaliation cases under Section 10(a)(2) of the Act.88 The court held that the 
employee claiming an unfair labor practice under Section 10(a)(2) must first 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer was motivated to 
take adverse action against the employee because that employee participated in 
union activities.89 The court observed that motive is a question of fact that can be 
demonstrated through direct or circumstantial evidence. 90 Citing federal 
precedent, the court observed that antiunion motivation can be inferred from 
evidence of the employer’s hostility towards unionization together with the 
employer’s knowledge of the employee’s participation in organizing efforts;91 the 
proximity in time between the alleged adverse action and the employee’s union 
activities;92 disparate treatment or targeting of known union supporters for 
adverse actions;93 and inconsistencies in the employer’s proffered reasons for the 
adverse action or shifting reasons for its adverse actions.94  
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Once motivation for the adverse action is established, the burden shifts to the 
employer to prove it took the adverse action for legitimate reasons and that the 
employer would have taken the action despite the employee’s union activities.95  
In affirming the appellate court’s decision, the supreme court noted two points in 
the appellate court’s analysis requiring clarification to avoid confusion in future 
cases.96 The supreme court observed the appellate court proceeded to a “dual 
motive” analysis before determining whether the City of Burbank’s proffered 
reasons for discharging Randle were indeed legitimate, i.e., bona fide, even 
though the “dual motive” analysis necessarily requires proof there was a lawful 
motive in addition to the alleged unlawful one.97 The supreme court also viewed 
the appellate court’s determination that evidence of the City of Burbank’s 
knowledge of Randle’s union activities or the City’s pattern of conduct was 
sufficient to support a violation, as a departure from federal precedent requiring 
a showing of the employer’s knowledge 0f an employee’s union activities in 
addition to evidence of the employer’s hostility towards union organizing.98 
 
IV. RETALIATION UNDER SECTION 10(a)(1) OF THE ACT 
 
After the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in City of Burbank, both State and 
Local Boards issued decisions applying the analysis from Section 10(a)(2) of the 
Act to evaluate allegations of employer retaliatory conduct arising under Section 
10(a)(1).99 In each case, the boards found that the nature of retaliatory conduct 
required a determination of motive but found that the objective test provided an 
inadequate means to arrive at that determination. The boards found the analysis 
used to evaluate conduct under Section 10(a)(2) set forth in City of Burbank, 
which required a showing of motive, provided the appropriate method to 
determine whether the conduct coerced, restrained or interfered with employee 
rights under the Act.100  
 
In Chicago Housing Authority (Kirk),101 the Local Board dismissed allegations 
that the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) retaliated against William Kirk, a 
janitor in its employ and steward for his union, Service Employees International 
Union, Local 1, in violation of Section 10(a)(1) of the Act.102 Kirk claimed the CHA 
denied his transfer grievance and then denied his bids for promotion because he 
filed grievances on his own behalf and on behalf of others in his bargaining unit, 
and because he served as a union steward.103 The hearing officer concluded 
CHA’s conduct did not violate Section 10(a)(1) of the Act because the CHA had 
justifiable reasons for denying Kirk’s transfer grievance and promotional bids, 
even though the CHA’s actions were against Kirk’s interest.104  
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The Local Board adopted the hearing officer’s conclusion that the CHA’s actions 
did not violate Section 10(a)(1) but modified the analysis applied.105 It 
distinguished the allegations in the case before it from “one involving a threat or 
question which may be evaluated as to whether it would reasonably have had the 
effect of coercing, restraining or interfering with the exercise of protected 
rights.”106 It observed that allegations that employer actions “were committed 
against [an employee] because of, and in retaliation for” an employee’s exercise 
of rights guaranteed by the Act, require a determination that the employer’s 
“action was in fact illegally motivated.”107 As such, the Local Board found the 
objective test articulated in prior Local Board cases,108 which does not consider 
motive but evaluates whether conduct “had the effect of coercing, restraining or 
interfering with the exercise of protected rights,” inadequately assessed the 
nature of the retaliatory conduct to determine whether such retaliatory conduct 
violated Section 10(a)(1) of the Act.109 Thus, the Local Board found the analysis 
“must track” the analysis used in evaluating cases arising under Section 10(a)(2) 
of the Act.110 Applying this analysis, the Local Board found CHA’s actions did not 
violate Section 10(a)(1) of the Act because the CHA advanced legitimate business 
reasons for its actions against Kirk, and Kirk failed to demonstrate those reasons 
were pretextual.111 
 
Following the Local Board’s reasoning regarding the “objective test,” the State 
Board in County of Jersey (Lewis and McAdams),112 likewise applied the 
framework under Section 10(a)(2) to determine whether the adverse employment 
actions at issue violated Section 10(a)(1) of the Act.113 In that case, Don Lewis and 
Michael McAdams, employees of the County of Jersey Highway Department, 
alleged the County of Jersey unlawfully laid them off and eventually discharged 
them in retaliation for filing a grievance raising perceived safety concerns.114 
Because there was no evidence that the County of Jersey discriminated against 
Lewis and McAdams based on their union membership, the State Board found no 
violation arising under Section 10(a)(2) but concluded the County of Jersey 
retaliated against them based on their grievance activity in violation of Section 
10(a)(1) of the Act.115  
 
Like the Local Board found in Chicago Housing Authority (Kirk),116 the State 
Board determined the objective test to be inadequate in evaluating retaliatory 
conduct under Section 10(a)(1) because the nature of retaliatory conduct 
necessarily required an examination of motive, The State Board thus found a 
Section 10(a)(2)-type analysis to be applicable.117 It also found that a Section 
10(a)(2)-type analysis was appropriate because “union activity” and “protected 
concerted activity” are both protected under the Act, and so reprisals based on 
either activity would be prohibited.118 The State Board determined that the 
employees established the elements of a prima facie case used in County of 
Peoria,119 finding three elements—protected concerted activity, the employer’s 
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knowledge of that activity, and an adverse employment action—were undisputed 
and that the adverse action was taken under suspect circumstances.120 In so 
finding, the State Board determined suspect circumstances existed based on 
evidence of the employer’s expression of hostility or animus toward the 
employees’ grievances, which suggested a causal connection between the 
employees’ layoff and discharge and the protected concerted activity.121 The State 
Board then found the County of Jersey’s reasons for the layoff and discharge were 
pretexts for its illegal motive and concluded the County of Jersey vi0lated Section 
10(a)(1) of the Act. 122 
  
The application of the Section 10(a)(2) analysis to retaliation cases under Section 
10(a)(1) was further settled in Pace Suburban Bus Division of the Regional 
Transportation Authority v. ILRB, Local Panel.123 In the underlying Board 
decision, the Local Panel adopted the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) findings 
and conclusions that PACE Northwest Division (Pace) committed unfair labor 
practices in violation of Section 10(a)(1) of the Act when it discharged one of its 
employees for participating in protected concerted activity.124 The employee, 
Urszula Panikowski, a bus operator employed by Pace, alleged she was 
discharged in retaliation for her successful grievance of an earlier discharge and 
resulting reinstatement.125  
 
Because the allegations involved retaliation for Panikowski’s grievance filing, i.e., 
concerted activity, the ALJ determined they should be analyzed as retaliation 
under Section 10(a)(1) of the Act and, following the Board’s decisions in County 
of Jersey and Chicago Housing Authority (Kirk), applied the Section 10(a)(2) 
burden-shifting analysis, substituting “protected concerted activity in the 10(a)(1) 
analysis for union activity.”126 The ALJ concluded Panikowski met her burden by 
establishing: (1) she engaged in protected concerted activity by filing and 
prevailing in her grievance over her prior discharge; (2) the decision-makers in 
her discharge at issue were aware of her successful grievance and resulting 
reinstatement; and (3) a causal connection between her protected concerted 
activity and her current discharge though circumstantial evidence of the 
employer’s shifting reasons for her current discharge.127 After finding Panikowski 
established a prima facie case, the ALJ shifted the burden to PACE to 
demonstrate it would have discharged Panikowski in the absence of her 
successful grievance of her prior discharge and determined Pace failed to satisfy 
its burden, thus concluding Pace violated Section 10(a)(1) of the Act.128  
 
Pace petitioned the Illinois Appellate Court to review the Local Panel’s decision, 
contending, inter alia, that the Board erred by sustaining a violation without a 
demonstration of antiunion animus.129 The court affirmed the Board’s decision, 
specifically rejecting Pace’s argument that proof of antiunion animus is required 
to establish a violation under Section 10(a)(1).130 The court found that to establish 
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retaliation under Section 10(a)(1), an employee must demonstrate “retaliation for 
engaging in activities protected by the Act, regardless of whether it is considered 
union activity or the [adverse action] was otherwise motivated by antiunion 
animus.”131 Recognizing that Section 10(a)(1) in general does not require a 
demonstration of an improper motive, the court observed that when employees 
claim their employers took an adverse employment action against them, they 
necessarily claim their employer acted with an illegal motive.132 The court further 
recognized that Section 10(a)(1) broadly protects employees’ rights under the Act, 
whereas Section 10(a)(2) provides narrower protection from adverse employment 
actions based on union membership and activities.133  
 
Agreeing with the Board’s contention, the court determined a prima facie case of 
retaliation under Section 10(a)(1) requires employees to demonstrate: (1) they 
engaged in protected concerted activity; (2) their employer was aware of the 
nature of their activity; and (3) the employer took an adverse employment action 
against them for “discriminatory reasons, i.e., animus toward [their] 
participation in such activities.”134 The court found Pace’s reliance on the Illinois 
Supreme Court’s decision in City of Burbank misplaced, noting the language of 
the supreme court’s holding in that case indicated that a showing of either 
antiunion animus or that the employee’s protected activity was a substantial or 
motivating factor would support a finding of an unfair labor practice.135 The court 
also found support for this interpretation of the supreme court’s holding in the 
Fifth District’s decision in Sheriff of Jackson County v. ISLRB,136 its decision in 
Speed District 802 v. Warning,137 and in federal precedent.138 The court reasoned 
that requiring a showing of antiunion animus in addition to proving the employer 
was motivated to take an adverse action because the employee participated in 
activity protected by the Act, places an undue burden on employees.139 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The answer to the question “which ULP is it?” or whether the conduct at issue 
violates Section 10(a)(1) or Section 10(a)(2) appears to depend on the 
circumstances surrounding the alleged violative conduct and motive. Section 
10(a)(2) prohibits a public employer from discriminating in employment actions 
based on support for a labor organization. As such, many of the cases where the 
Board has found violations of Section 10(a)(2) involved employee participation in 
union organizing efforts or other circumstances demonstrating the employer 
acted against employees with anti-union animus, i.e., to “discourage or 
encourage” support for a labor organization.  
 
Because Section 10(a)(2) requires a specific motive—to encourage or discourage 
support for a union—it follows that retaliatory conduct will not constitute a 
violation of that section in the absence of evidence of anti-union animus. As the 
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above discussion suggests, the absence of anti-union motivation may defeat a 
violation under Section 10(a)(2) of the Act, but it does not end the inquiry for 
retaliatory conduct may still constitute a violation of Section 10(a)(1) which 
broadly prohibits conduct that “interfere[s] with, restrain[s], or coerces” 
participation in concerted activity.  
 
When an employer denies an individual employee rights or threatens or prevents 
the employee from exercising rights guaranteed by the Act, such as filing a 
grievance or invoking Weingarten rights, motive is not a consideration because 
the conduct on its face would be a violation of Section 10(a)(1). In such cases, the 
Board has applied an objective test to evaluate whether the conduct violates 
Section 10(a)(1). But the Board in Chicago Housing Authority (Kirk)140 and 
County of Jersey,141 recognizing the inadequacy of the objective test in evaluating 
an employer’s retaliatory conduct, considered the employer’s motive for its 
actions. To determine if the employer acted with an improper motive, the Board 
applied the burden-shifting analysis used in Section 10(a)(2)-type cases, 
substituting the narrower anti-union support motive for a broader “anti-“ 
concerted activity motive. If an employee can demonstrate the employer took 
action against them because they engaged in concerted activity, Section 10(a)(1) 
may provide protection from adverse employment actions without having to 
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By Student Editorial Board: 
Patrick J. Foote, Mayra Gomez, Michael P. Halpin, Matt Soaper 
I. IELRA Developments 
A. Duty of Fair Representation 
In Bowles v. Elmhurst Teachers Council, West Suburban Teachers Union, 
IFT-AFT, 36 PERI ¶ 58 (IELRB 2019), the IELRB upheld its Executive 
Director’s dismissal of an unfair labor practice charge which alleged that 
the union breached its duty of fair representation when it failed to file a 
grievance of unfair labor practice charge challenging the charging party’s 
receipt of a letter of notice in her personnel file.  
On December 3, 2018, Michele C. Bowles, a teacher, filed an unfair labor 
practice charge with the IELRB alleging that Elmhurst Teachers Council, 
West Suburban Teachers Union, Local 571, IFT-AFT committed unfair 
labor practices when it failed to represent her during meetings with 
Elmhurst Community Unit School District 205 that resulted in a letter or 
notice in her personnel file. Sometime after filing her initial charge, Bowles 
ran for union president and submitted additional evidence to the IELRB 
not available during the initial investigation. Bowles maintained that 
statements made by the incumbent president on his campaign website and 
in emails to union members criticizing Bowles for filing the charge 
indicated that the incumbent was a significant reason why the union 
decided to not file a grievance on her behalf. Bowles also submitted the 
incumbent’s answers to union members’ questions in which he criticized 
Bowles for her conduct when she served as union vice-president. 
The Executive Director reasoned that the union’s conduct in the context of 
a union election is an internal union matter over which the “IELRB ha[d] 
no jurisdiction unless there was an impact on or nexus to a charging party’s 
employment conditions.” Since there was no such nexus in this case, the 
IELRB had no jurisdiction. Furthermore, even if the IELRB had 
jurisdiction, there was no correlation between the former union president’s 
comments and the union’s decision to not act on behalf of Bowles.  
Bowles filed exceptions claiming that (1) the union refused her requests to 
meet with her in violation of its duty of fair representation and that (2) the 
union’s failure to provide evidence that it met and discussed the appeal of 
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the District’s decision regarding the letter of notice in her file established 
that it breached its duty of fair representation.  
The IELRB concluded that the record did not support the contention that 
the union refused to meet with Bowles because the union submitted emails 
from the incumbent to Bowles in which he invited her to meet with him to 
discuss concerns regarding her disciplinary action. Additionally, the IELRB 
concluded that the absence of evidence that the union met and discussed 
Bowles’ appeal did not establish a breach of its duty of fair representation. 
The IELRB reasoned that a union has wide discretion in in representing the 
bargaining unit and there is no requirement that discretion be exercised by 
a group of officials rather than just one or two. The Board affirmed the 
Executive Director’s dismissal of the unfair labor practice charge. 
B. Unfair Labor Practice Charge Timeliness 
In Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1, IFT-AFT and Chicago Board of 
Education, 36 PERI ¶ 43 (IELRB 2019), the IELRB held that an unfair 
labor practice charge filed by the Chicago Teacher’s Union against the 
Chicago Board of Education more than six months after the alleged unfair 
labor practice was untimely. Consequently, the charge alleging that the 
Chicago Board of Education violated Sections 14(a)(3) and derivatively (1) 
of the IELRA was dismissed in its entirety.  
During the spring of 2017, two probationary teachers, Witwoski and 
Miglietta, were involved in organizing and circulating a letter to the Uplift 
Local School Council (LSC) and office of CBE Network 2 that expressed a 
lack of confidence in the school principal. In December 2017, Miglietta was 
involved in organizing a meeting at the Chicago Grassroots Curriculum 
Taskforce to discuss concerns about poor administrative leadership and its 
negative impact on students, teachers, and the school. The principal issued 
pre-disciplinary notices in January 2018. The notices accused Witowski of 
being tardy and Miglietta of not complying with Uplift’s lesson plan.  
The principal then issued a second pre-disciplinary notice to Miglietta 
accusing him of verbally humiliating a new staff member. On June 1, 2018 
the two received correspondence indicating their appointments would not 
be renewed. They received “unsatisfactory” summative evaluation ratings 
on September 21, 2018. The Chicago Teachers’ Union filed the unfair labor 
practice charge on March 1, 2019.  
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The IELRB held that the six-month charge-filing period began to run when 
Witowski and Miglietta received the letters on June 1, 2019, notifying them 
that their appointments were not being renewed. The IELRB additionally 
found Witowski and Miglietta’s receipt of lowered summative evaluations 
on September 21, 2018 was inconsequential because they should have 
known of the Chicago Board of Education’s alleged retaliatory conduct from 
the June 1 letters. Because the charge was filed more than six months after 
June 1, 2018, the IELRB dismissed it as untimely. 
II. IPLRA Developments 
A.  Duty to Bargain 
In Policemen’s Benevolent Labor Committee, and County of Cook and 
Sheriff of Cook County, 36 PERI ¶ 54 (ILRB Local Panel 2019), the ILRB 
Local Panel overruled its ALJ and held that the union waived its right to 
bargain over the effects of the Sheriff’s decision to lay off 18 lieutenants. 
In 2017, the union and Cook County Sheriff’s office were approaching the 
expiration date of their current collective bargaining agreement. They had 
agreed to extend the terms of the previous contract until they reached a 
new agreement. In November of that year, the Sherriff’s office informed the 
union that of the need to lay off 18 lieutenants. The Sherriff’s office and 
union met multiple times over the next few months to bargain over the 
effects of the layoff and to find a solution to avoid the layoffs. During these 
meetings, the Sherriff’s office agreed to delay the layoffs by about a month 
and extend the recall rights of the lieutenants. 
The ALJ found that, while the Sherriff’s office had no obligation to bargain 
over the decision, it still violated Section 10(a)(4) and 10(a)(1) because it 
did not bargain in good faith over the effects. The ALJ found that the layoff 
decision was implemented before impasse was reached in effects 
bargaining, as the final effects bargaining session occurred a few days after 
implementation. The Local Panel rejected the ALJ’s findings. The ILRB 
observed that the union sought to bargain over the effective date of the 
layoffs, the lieutenants’ compensatory time and seniority after the layoffs 
and the assignment and reassignment of lieutenants not laid off. The ILRB 
stated that the layoff date is an “an inevitable consequence of the layoff 
decision itself.” Therefore, the Sherriff’s office did not have to bargain over 
this issue and could proceed with the layoffs on the date of its choosing. The 
Local Panel further found that compensatory time and seniority were 
covered by the existing collective bargaining agreement and, therefore, 
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there was no duty to bargain further over these issues. As for assignment 
and reassignment, the ILRB found that the contract gave the Sheriff the 
right to make work assignments and determine the number of personnel 
needed to carry out the office’s duties. The ILRB held that the union clearly 
and unequivocally waived its right to bargain over this issue. 
 
 
In North Riverside Fire Fighters, Local 2714 and Village of North 
Riverside, 36 PERI ¶56 (ILRB State Panel 2019), the State Panel held that 
the Village violated Section 10(a)(4) by failing to maintain the status quo 
while interest arbitration proceedings were pending.  
On March 14, 2018, North Riverside Fire Fighters Local 2714 filed an unfair 
labor practice charge against the Village of North Riverside alleging that the 
Village violated Sections 10(a)(4) and (1) of the Act when it changed the 
health insurance of newly-hired firefighters during the pendency of impasse 
resolution proceedings. The Village argued that the health insurance that it 
provided to newly hired firefighters was “substantially equal, as the 
contract required.” 
The instant charges arose out of a longstanding contract battle. The parties’ 
collective bargaining agreement expired in 2014. After months of 
negotiation, the parties requested mediation with the Federal Mediation 
and Conciliation Service. After that failed, the union filed for interest 
arbitration. The union then filed charges alleging that the Village engaged 
in “surface bargaining over a proposal to privatize its fire department.” 
When the Village sent the union a letter “purporting to terminate the 
collective bargaining agreement and the employment of all firefighters,” the 
union filed an unfair labor practice charge. It was determined that the 
Village had violated the IPLRA. The parties were still working under the 
expired collective bargaining agreement. 
The administrative law judge found, and the State Panel agreed, that the 
change to the health insurance for new employees constituted a failure to 
maintain the status quo during the pendency of interest arbitration 
hearings and was a violation of the Act. “The test for determining whether a 
practice is sufficiently established to constitute the status quo requires a 
determination of four factors, (1) the parties’ past history, (2) their past 
bargaining practices, (3) the terms of the existing collective bargaining 
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agreement, and (4) the reasonable expectations of employees.” The 
language of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement allowed the 
Respondent to change health insurance plans as long as the benefits were 
“substantially equal.” The ALJ determined, among other things, that the 
new plan “significantly increase[d] employees’ up-front costs.” What’s 
more, the Respondent’s agents had implicitly acknowledged that the there 
was “a significant disparity” between the plans and that conduct “fostered 
employees’ reasonable expectations that [the new plans] were not 
substantially equal to [the old] plan and that the Respondent therefore 
would not unilaterally substitute” one for the other. 
